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INDIVIDUAL-BASED, CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION:
A NATIONAL SECURITY PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE
DANIEL A. RESTREPO*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Even a cursory review of the past four years reveals seemingly
limitless potential challenges facing national security practitioners,
including violent extremists, transnational criminals, hackers,
rogue states, pandemics, earthquakes, tsunamis, super storms, and
economic and financial meltdowns.
Less visible, but no less real, is another group that regularly
affects the national security policy process: individual litigants.
Although by no means a new phenomenon,1 individual-based,
cross-border litigation—be it inside or outside U.S. courts—is a fact
of life that affects the national security policy process. For
example, during my more than three years leading the Western
Hemisphere policy process on the National Security Staff at the
White House, cases—or potential cases—affected the policy
making context touching on U.S. relations with Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico, to
name only a small sample.

* Daniel A. Restrepo is the founder and Managing Director of Restrepo
Strategies LLC, an international strategic consulting firm. Restrepo served as
President Barack Obama’s primary advisor on the Western Hemisphere for six
years, including more than three years as Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the National Security Staff at
the White House. Restrepo also served as an advisor to the 2008 and 2012 Obama
for America presidential campaigns. The views reflected in this note are the
author’s alone.
1 The Jay and Marshall Courts, for example, handled plenty of litigation
involving foreign affairs from the earliest days of our republic. See Ariel N.
Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 867–86 (2005)
(attempting to understand the judicial role in foreign policy by analyzing the
foreign affairs dockets of the Jay and Marshall Courts).
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INDIVIDUAL LITIGANTS, SYSTEMIC EFFECTS

Four brief case studies help demonstrate how individual-based
litigation affects the U.S. national security policy-making process.
The four cases are:
1. The touchstone for this Symposium—the Lago Agrio
litigation in Ecuador;
2. Litigation stemming from Argentina’s December 2001
sovereign debt default;2
3. Doe v. Zedillo,3 an Alien Tort Claims Act case against
former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo; and
4. Martinez v. Cuba,4 an attachment proceeding in U.S.
Federal District Court stemming from a Florida state
court default judgment.
2.1. Chevron & Lago Agrio
The implications of environmental, mass-tort litigation in
Ecuador involving Chevron long-ago spilled into the policymaking context as litigants and the Government of Ecuador have
extensively lobbied the U.S. Executive and Congress regarding the
litigation’s potential implications for U.S. policy toward Ecuador.
Chevron and its backers, for example, have frequently
petitioned the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and
others in the Executive Branch, as well as members of Congress’s
key trade committees—the Senate Committee on Finance and the

2 For background on the default and resulting U.S.-based litigation, see
generally EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding
that funds belonging to the Argentina’s central bank held in the Federal Reserve
Bank are not an attachable interest of the Republic of Argentina). See also Lucy
Reed, Scorecard of Investment Treaty Cases Against Argentina Since 2001, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (Mar. 2, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009
/03/02/scorecard-of-investment-treaty-cases-against-argentina-since-2001/
(listing international arbitration cases arising from the 2001 default).
3 Complaint, Doe v. Zedillo, No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 16,
2011), available at http://acteal97.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/complaint_
cover_sheet.pdf.
4 Order Granting Summary Judgment and Dissolving Writs of Garnishment,
Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 10-cv22095-FAM) available at http://www.exportlawblog.com/docs/martinez_v_
cuba.pdf (granting Garnishees’ Motion for Dissolution of Writs of Garnishment,
Summary Judgment, and Attorneys’ Fees as well as Government’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and to quash Plaintiff’s Writs of Garnishment).
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House of Representatives Committee on Ways & Means—to
eliminate Ecuador’s benefits under the Andean Trade Promotion
and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).5
Based in part on ATPDEA, the United States is Ecuador’s
largest trade partner.6 The argument has been made that such
preferential access to the world’s largest market should not be
provided to a country that has subjected a U.S. company to the
treatment that Chevron contends it has faced in Ecuador. Even
though the bilateral relationship encompasses issues well beyond a
dispute between private litigants,7 Chevron’s concerns regarding
the Lago Agrio litigation have colored ATPDEA discussions in
Washington and almost certainly will again when the issue comes
up for consideration in 2013.
The impact of Lago Agrio on the policy-making context
highlights one of the inherent difficulties that come with litigation
and its effects. It is common, for example, for officials from other
countries to complain about U.S. judicial processes and request
that the U.S. Executive Branch weigh in on pending litigation. As a
White House staffer, one of the first things you learn is the clear
policy of non-intervention in pending judicial processes. The wellfounded independence of our judiciary is emphasized until foreign
government counterparts move on to a new topic.
Other countries have also learned to invoke “judicial
independence”—well-founded or otherwise—to U.S. policymakers who complain about judicial processes in their countries.

5 Under ATPDEA, a broad class of Ecuadoran products—most importantly
fresh-cut flowers—enjoys duty-free access to the United States in exchange for
Ecuador’s cooperation regarding counter-narcotics efforts.
Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 3101, 116 Stat. 1023
(2002).
6 See Bureau of W. Hemisphere Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Ecuador,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 24 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35761.
htm (explaining the economic relationship between the U.S. and Ecuador).
7 The U.S.-Ecuador relationship has been complicated by actions taken by the
Ecuadorian government in recent years, including the expulsion of the U.S.
ambassador in the wake of WikiLeaks and the prior expulsion of other senior
embassy personnel. See Associated Press, Ecuador: U.S. Ambassador Expelled over
WikiLeaks, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 5, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
2100-202_162-20050944.html (reporting that Ecuador expelled the U.S.
ambassador, making her the third U.S. diplomat to be kicked out of the country
since 2008, because she allegedly accused Ecuador’s police chief of corruption in a
cable).
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Being seen as passing judgment on the veracity or integrity of a
foreign judicial process is a tricky business, at best, and
underscores the dilemma posed by cases like Lago Agrio that
revolve in no small measure around questions regarding the basic
fairness of judicial processes in a foreign country.
2.2. Argentine Debt Litigation
In December 2001, the Government of Argentina defaulted on
$100 billion in sovereign debt, triggering a mass of litigation, the
implications of which have spilled into the policy-making context
through two distinct channels.
The first is through actions brought by corporations whose
dollar-denominated contracts were severely impaired when the
Argentine government unilaterally determined that it would
instead make its payments in devalued Argentine pesos. In
response, numerous U.S. companies sought relief before the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). Multiple ICSID panels issued judgments in favor of U.S.
companies, but the Argentine government subsequently decided
that the judgments were not self-executing and needed to be
brought to an Argentine court for enforcement.8
When ICSID judgment holders balked and the Argentine
government refused to pay, their dispute spilled into the broader
U.S.-Argentina policy-making context as the aggrieved U.S.
companies petitioned USTR to revoke Argentina’s eligibility for
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).9
In October 2011, when President Obama met Argentina’s
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner on the margins of the G20 Summit in France, ICSID and GSP were on the top of their
agenda.10 They would again be high on the agenda when the two
Presidents met in April 2012 on the margins of the Summit of the

8 See U.S. Dep’t of State, GSP Fact Sheet, U.S. EMBASSY: BUENOS AIRES
http://argentina.usembassy.gov/gsp2.html (last vistied May 7. 2013) (explaining
why Argentina’s GSP benefits have been suspended).
9 See id.
10 See US: Obama-CFK Meeting ‘Warm,’ But Argentina Must Cancel Debt,
BUENOS AIRES HERALD, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/
84136/us-obamacfk-meeting-warm-but-argentina-must-cancel-debt (explaining
that, while in Cannes, Fernández de Kirchner and Obama discussed bilateral
relations and Argentina’s debt restructuring with the Paris Club).
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Americas in Colombia.11 The end result: Argentina continues to
refuse to pay the ICSID judgments, Argentine products no longer
enjoy preferential access to the United States after President
Obama revoked GSP for Argentina,12 and the two leaders spent a
disproportionate amount of scarce meeting time discussing narrow
commercial disputes.
The second way in which litigation has affected the
relationship between the two countries—that could otherwise
focus on a myriad of hemispheric and global issues—is through
litigation brought by bondholders, particularly bondholders that
have rejected two different Argentine settlements with other
bondholders.
The hold-out bondholders have pursued an aggressive
litigation strategy and made their views and displeasure regarding
the Argentine government well known to Executive Branch and
Congressional policy makers.13 Although the bondholders were
not formally part of the ICSID-GSP saga, their efforts clearly
affected the policy-making environment.
In late 2012, the far-flung effects of Argentine bondholder
litigation took a turn toward magical realism when the Argentine
tall ship the ARA Libertad, a large ceremonial sailboat owned and
operated by the Argentine Navy, was seized in accordance with a
local court order by Ghanaian authorities when it made a port of
call during a training tour.14 Behind the court order stood
bondholders seeking to enforce judgments to pay outstanding

11 See CFK and Obama Agree to Solve Trade Differences, BUENOS AIRES HERALD,
Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/98164/cfk-andobama-agree-to-solve-trade-differences (indicating that Obama requested the
meeting in advance of the summit while Argentina was “facing questions from
industrialized nations about trade barriers . . . .”).
12 See U.S. EMBASSY, supra note 8 (“The United States is thus statutorily
required to revoke Argentina’s GSP benefits.”).
13 The most prominent effort has been undertaken by the American Task
Force Argentina. See generally About Us, AM. TASK FORCE ARGENTINA: PURSUING A
FAIR RECONCILIATION OF THE ARGENTINE DEBT DEFAULT, http://www.atfa.org/
about-us/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (communicating AFTA’s mission and
methods for achieving a negotiated settlement of the Argentine debt default).
14 See Daniel Politi, Liberty or Debt, a post in Latitude: Views From Around The
World, THE INT’L HERALD TRIB. GLOBAL OPINION (Oct. 17, 2012, 6:37 AM),
http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/holders-of-argentinas-defaulteddebt-hold-up-a-frigate-in-ghana (recounting the taking of the ARA Libertad, an
Argentine training frigate, as due payment for Argentina’s debt default).
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obligations against the Argentine government,15 underscoring the
far-reaching effects of individual-based, cross-broader litigation in
a shrinking world.16
2.3. Doe vs. Zedillo
Individual-based, cross-border litigation in U.S. courts—just
like cases filed abroad—can also affect the U.S. policy-making
process.
Doe v. Zedillo—a suit filed in U.S. District Court in Connecticut
in September 2011 against a former President of Mexico, Ernesto
Zedillo, who now works at Yale and thus lives in Connecticut— is
an example of such litigation, and its effects. The complaint seeks
$50 million in damages for alleged violations of the Alien Tort
Claims Act, the Torture Victims Claims Act, customary
international law, and various international human rights
conventions for the actions taken by Mexican security forces in
Acteal, Chiapas, Mexico, on December 22, 1997, when Zedillo was
President of Mexico.17
Alien Tort Claims Act litigation is not new,18 nor is its
interaction with, and effects on, U.S. international relations.19
During the course of decades, plaintiffs have brought cases in U.S.
courts that have implicated governments around the world,

15 See id. (Investment firm NML Capital petitioned the Ghanaian judge to
prohibit the ship from leaving port).
16 As it continues in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, the underlying bondholder litigation has raised the specter of
another Argentine debt default, and spawned a dispute as to whether rulings in
that case endanger the New York Federal Reserve Bank’s $2.6 trillion payments
system. See Agustino Fontevecchia, Billionaire’s Hedge Fund Rebuffs NY Fed in
Argentina Case: No Risk to $2.6T Payments System, FORBES.COM (Nov. 26, 2012, 8:40
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/11/26/billionaireshedge-fund-rebuffs-ny-fed-in-argentina-case-no-risk-to-2-6t-payments-system
(describing the potential implications of litigation “[p]itting a hedge fund against
a nation”).
17 Complaint at 1, 8, Doe v. Zedillo, No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept.
16, 2011), available at http://acteal97.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
complaint_cover_sheet.pdf.
18 See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789:
A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 461–62 (1989) (citing federal district court
actions brought as early as 1980 under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
19 See generally id.
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touching on relations with governments that were friends and foes
of the United States.20
There is no country in the world more important to the United
States today than Mexico, and there is perhaps no country in the
world with whom we have a more complex relationship given our
shared history and geography. Mexico is the third largest U.S.
trading partner21 and the second largest destination for U.S.
exports, with more than $1 billion in trade, on average, crossing the
shared border every day.22 It is our second largest source of
imported oil.23 We have deep cultural, familial, and historical ties
to Mexico—the country of origin for the largest segment of foreignborn individuals in the United States.24 Transnational criminal
organizations traffic in people, drugs, guns, and money across our
shared border with devastating consequences for communities in
both countries.
The intensity of the bilateral relationship is evident in the fact
that, in my more than three years as the President’s principal
White House advisor on the Western Hemisphere, the maximum
number of times I visited any particular country in my area of
responsibility other than Mexico was four; I visited Mexico
seventeen times.
Despite the depth and breadth of the relationship, in 2011 and
2012, the 1997 Acteal massacre became a focal point of U.S.-Mexico
relations. The government of out-going Mexican President Felipe

20 See id. at 461–64 (explaining that foreign citizens have employed the Alien
Tort Claims Act as a vehicle for suing inter alia the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan
“contras,” the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and an Argentine military
general).
21 See Top Trading Partners – Total Trade, Exports, Imports: Year-to-Date
November 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1211yr.html (serving as a source of
data about United States trade and the economy).
22 Id.
23 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum & Other Liquids: U.S. Imports by
Country of Origin, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm (listing U.S. import
of petroleum and other liquids in annual-thousand barrels by country of origin).
24 See Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Table 42. Foreign-Born
Population by Citizenship Status and Place of Birth: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0042.pdf (reporting
the number of foreign-born individuals in the United States by place of birth and
citizenship status as recorded in 2009).
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Calderón urged the United States to support former President
Zedillo’s head of state immunity claim in Doe v. Zedillo25 and not
without some personal concern regarding cross-border litigation.
During his tenure, President Calderón, who also moved to the
United States upon leaving office, intensified the Mexican
government’s efforts against transnational criminal organizations,
sparking abuses claims from human rights organizations26 and
touching off attempts to initiate cross-border legal proceedings. In
November 2011, for example, Mexican human rights activists filed
a war crimes complaint in the International Criminal Court (ICC)
against Calderón and Mexico’s top drug trafficker, Joaquín
“Chapo” Guzmán, raising the specter that individual-based, crossborder litigation would follow Calderón from office.27
In September 2012, upon petition of the court, the U.S.
government filed a brief, consistent with past practice, supporting
Zedillo’s immunity defense. Doe v. Zedillo remains pending before
the District Court, and the ICC has yet to determine the disposition
of the initial complaint against Calderón. Nevertheless, these cases
demonstrate how litigation triggered by individuals can have a
direct impact, at least in the context of U.S. relations, at the highest
levels with our most important global partners.

25 See Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Moves to Grant Former Mexican President
Immunity in Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09
/09/world/americas/us-moves-to-grant-former-mexican-president-immunity-insuit.html (recounting a statement by the U.S. government recommending that the
federal court dismiss the suit against Zedillo on head of state immunity grounds);
Daniel Ozawa Sussman, Mexico: Calderón Administration Demanded Immunity for
Ex-President, PULSAMERICA (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2012
/09/17/mexico-calderon-administration-demanded-immunity-for-ex-presidentzedillo/ (relating that the Mexican ambassador warned the U.S. government of
the potential diplomatic consequences stemming from the lawsuit against
Zedillo).
26 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY:
KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” (2011).
27 See Sara Webb & Manuel Rueda, Mexican Group Asks ICC to Probe President,
Officials, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/11/26/us-mexico-icc-idUSTRE7AO0TA20111126 (reporting on a request by
Mexican human rights activists that the ICC investigate President Calderón’s
supposed responsibility for drug-related violence in Mexico); Diana Castrillòn,
Mexico Presidency Threatens Legal Action over ICC Complaint, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.ntn24.com/news/news/mexico-presidencythreatens-legal-action-over-icc-complaint (describing backlash by the Mexican
presidency in response to the ICC complaint).
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2.4. Martinez v. Cuba
The intersection of individual-based litigation and U.S. foreign
policy is also evident in the thicket of statutory and administrative
rules and regulations and related litigation that has accumulated
over the course of the last fifty years of U.S. policy toward Cuba.28
These statutes include, perhaps, the most direct attempt to use
individual-based litigation as a tool of U.S. policy—the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,29 which, among
other things, established an individual right of action in U.S.
District Court for those who had property confiscated by Cuban
authorities after the Cuban Revolution and who subsequently
became U.S. citizens.30 This unprecedented expansion of U.S.
jurisdiction, which was meant to freeze efforts by Cuba to attract
direct foreign investment, has never come into force. It included a
national security waiver by which every six months the President
of the United States can toll its entry into force. Thus far, three
Presidents have exercised this waiver, thirty-one times in total.31
That, however, does not mean the U.S.-Cuba policy thicket is
not affected by individual-based litigation in the United States. It
most certainly is.
Cases brought in Florida state courts alleging human rights
violations by Cuban authorities represent the principal
manifestation of this phenomenon. As Cuba has regularly refused
to appear, let alone defend itself, in these cases, a series of
significant default judgments have accumulated against the Cuban

28 See generally DIANNE E. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, U.S.-CUBAN
RELATIONS: AN ANALYTIC COMPENDIUM OF U.S. POLICIES, LAWS & REGULATIONS
(2005), available at http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/2005-03-U.S.Cuban_Relations.pdf (”This compendium presents the texts of the U.S. policy
statements, laws and regulations . . . that govern U.S. relations with Cuba.”).
29 22 U.S.C. Ch. 69A (2012).
30 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2012).
31 See Stephen F. Propst, Presidential Authority To Modify Economic
Sanctions Against Cuba 7 (Feb. 15, 2011) (unpublished forum paper), available at
http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/57d34e80-51b8-4ee0-ae64750f65ee7642/Preview/PublicationAttachment/55896b90-840a-42bf-8744752a7a206333/Cuba%20Aritcle%20FINAL.pdf (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6085(c))
(reviewing the sources of the President’s authority to ease U.S. sanctions against
Cuba).
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government.32 Those judgments will add to the policy puzzle
when relations between the United States and Cuba change as
holders of those judgments are today U.S. citizens and, like
aggrieved former property holders in Cuba, are likely to petition
U.S. authorities to champion their interests. But those judgments
do not only promise to affect the future policy-making context;
they have real effects today and in 2011 threatened to undo
President Obama’s signature policy initiative related to Cuba.
In April 2009, President Obama eliminated all restrictions on
Cuban-American family visits and remittances to Cuba.33 In the
year that followed, more than 300,000 Cuban Americans—a record
number—visited Cuba.34 Such family travel relies on licensed air
charters as there has not been regularly scheduled commercial air
traffic between the United States and Cuba since 1962.
In 2010, a Florida plaintiff seeking to enforce a default
judgment almost brought these charters to a halt. After securing a
$27.2 million default judgment against Cuba, Ana Margarita
Martinez sought to collect the judgment by attaching the landing
fees U.S. air charter companies pay to Cuba. If the payment of
those fees had stopped, so too would have the President’s policy
initiative to increase the free flow of information to, from, and
among the Cuban people and decrease the dependence of the
Cuban people on the Cuban state.
The Martinez attachment litigation quickly found itself front
and center among policymakers in Washington. To preserve the
U.S. national security interests at the heart of the President’s policy
initiative, the United States intervened in the litigation,
32 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Cuban Exile Awarded $2.8B in Suit Against Castro
Government, A.B.A. J., Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
cuban_exile_awarded_2.8b_in_suit_against_castro_government/ (announcing a
large judgment against Cuba for an exiled individual who claimed persecution
and noting that because Cuba does not defend itself in alike lawsuits, judgments
against it have become “’almost automatic’”).
33 See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban
People (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Fact-Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people (summarizing President Obama’s
orders to cabinet members which were intended to “facilitate . . . contact between
separated family members in the United States and Cuba and increase the flow of
information and humanitarian resources directly to the Cuban people”).
34 Lizette Alvarez, Pull of Family Reshapes U.S.-Cuban Relations, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/us/cuban-americans-takelead-in-building-ties-with-cuba.html?pagewanted=all.
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successfully arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply with key
aspects of the regulatory thicket underlying U.S. policy toward
Cuba.35 The charters continue.
CONCLUSION
These four very different case studies highlight how a single
litigant, or group of litigants, can affect, either unintentionally or
purposefully, key U.S. foreign policy interests and relationships,
and how such result can happen without the litigant ever seeking
to make the United States a formal party to such litigation.
Just like a myriad of other man-made (and naturally occurring)
challenges, individual-based, cross-border litigation is a reality of
which every national security practitioner must be aware and
prepared to address head on.

35 See Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 13–14, Martinez
v. Republic of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 10-cv-20611-FAM),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/194063.pdf
(asserting that plaintiff could not satisfy her judgment as she neglected to obtain
applicable license required by U.S. regulations and no statute overrides such
regulations).
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